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1. Introduction: Languages, Foundations and Reification of Concepts
The term "language" is colloquially used in mathematics to refer to a theory, which 
grasps common features of a large range (or even all) of other mathematical theories 
and so can serve as a unifying conceptual framework for these theories. "Set-
theoretic language" is a case in point. The systematic work of translation of the whole 
of mathematics into the set-theoretic language has been endeavoured in 20-th 
century by a group of mathematicians under the collective name of Nicolas Bourbaki.  
Bourbakist mathematics proved successful both in research and higher education 
(albeit not in the school math education) and is practiced until today at mathematical 
departments worldwide.  
The project of Bourbaki as well as other attempts to do mathematics "set-
theoretically" should be definitely distinguished from the project of reduction of 
mathematics to set theory defended by Quine and some other philosophers. This latter 
project is based on the claim that all true mathematical propositions are deducible 
from axioms of Zermelo-Frenkael set theory with Choice (ZFC) or another appropriate 
system of axioms for sets, so basically all the mathematics is  set theory. A working 
mathematician usually sees this claim as an example of philosophical absurdity on a 
par with Zeno's claim that there is no motion, and Bourbaki never tried to put it 
forward. Actually Bourbaki used set theory (more precisely their own version of 
axiomatic theory of sets) for doing mathematics in very much the same way in which 
classical first-order logic is used for doing axiomatic theories like ZFC. In other words 
Bourbaki made set theory a "part of their logic", and then developed specific 
mathematical theories stipulating new axioms expressed in this extended language. 
According to the philosophical view just mentioned all Bourbaki's proofs are 
nevertheless translatable into deductions from axioms of set theory. I shall not go for 
pros and contras about this controversial claim here but put instead these two 
questions: (1)Which features of sets make set theory a reasonable candidate for 
foundations of mathematics? and (2)Which features of sets allow set theory to be an 
effective mathematical language? Although the two questions are mutually related 
they are not the same and require different answers. 
In order to answer the first question remind Hilbert's Grundlagen der Geometrie of 
1899 which provides the notion of foundation relevant to the question. Hilbert 
suggests to think of geometrical points and straight lines as of abstract "things" (of 
two different types) holding certain relations with required formal properties;  one is 
left free to imagine then these things in any way one likes or not imagine them in any 
particular way at all. However abstract and unspecific might be the notion of thing 
involved here one cannot avoid making certain assumptions about it. In order to clarify 
these assumptions one needs an appropriate "theory of things". Set theory proves 
appropriate for this purpose: sets provide the standard (Tarski) semantic for classical 
first-order logic and for theories axiomatised with this logic. Hence the idea to use set 
theory on a par with formal axiomatic method and the claim that mathematics is 
ultimately "about" sets.  Building of axiomatic set theories becomes then a rather 
tricky business since any such theory involves an infinite regress: in order to build an 
axiomatic theory of sets one needs to assume some (usually different) notion of set 
in advance for semantic purposes. This and other relevant problems about set theory 
and logic have been scrutinised by mathematicians and philosophers throughout 20th 
century. I shall not explore this vast issue here but I want to stress the intimate link 
between sets and formal axiomatic method just explained.  True, this method allows 
for building not only theories of sets but also theories of lines and points (plane 
geometries), of parts and wholes (mereologies) and of whatnot. However some notion 
of set  (or class) is anyway required by all such theories. Stronger technical notions of 
set corresponding to ZFC and other axiomatic set theories come about when this 
general requirement is further strengthened for specific mathematical needs. So when 
the notion of foundations is understood in the sense of Hilbert's Grundlagen or 
similarly the choice of set theory (rather than mereology or anything else) as 
foundations of mathematics is natural. 
Second question requires, in my view, a very different answer. There is more than one 
reason why set theory is helpful for mathematics but perhaps the following one is the 
most important. Mathematics doesn't deal with "pure" concepts - whatever this might 
mean - but deals with concepts embodied into mathematical objects. There are 
different ways of such embodiment or reification of concepts. The most traditional 
one is exemplification. When Euclid wants to prove that all triangles have certain 
property P he always proceeds in the following way. He takes "for example" just one 
triangle ABC , proves that ABC has property P and then concludes that all triangles 
have this property. The conclusion is justified when the proof doesn't rely on any 
specific property S of ABC,  which some other triangle A'B'C'  might not have. This 
guarantees that the same proof can be applied to A'B'C'  or any other triangle. Such 
"reification through instantiation" is also widely used in today's mathematics as well. It 
seems to be fairly fundamental for mathematics as we know it through its history.
However set theory provides another way of reifying concept. In the pre-set-theoretic 
mathematics people had among available objects particular triangles like ABC and 
particular (natural) numbers like 5 but they had no special mathematical object 
corresponding to the general concept of triangle or to the general concept of number 
(over and above the aforementioned particulars). Entities of this latter kind could be 
believed to exist somewhere on Platonic heavens but certainly not among 
mathematical objects. However set theory allowed for making such things up and 
treating them mathematically. Consider set T of all triangles (on a given plane) and set 
N of natural numbers. These sets are extensions of their corresponding concepts. 
They are genuine mathematical objects having certain properties (e.g. cardinality) and 
allowing for certain operations with them. In particular, N can be squared (the square 
of N is the set of all ordered number pairs) and factorised by some equivalence 
relation. Importantly T is not a triangle and N  is not a natural number: the extension of 
a given concept is not an instance of this concept. But like an instance 
the extension is an embodiment of a given concept: it is an object one can play with, 
i.e. make further constructions. Obviously this second way of reification of concepts 
was not available for mathematicians until the notion of infinite set was approved by 
G. Cantor and his followers. 
One may remind Occam's Razor and wonder why having more objects is an advantage. 
The answer is this: it is an advantage as far as it leads to new non-trivial 
mathematics. This is indeed the case as far as set-theoretic mathematics is 
concerned. Mathematicians can be interested in a conceptual parsimony but hardly in 
an ontological parsimony. I cannot see any profit mathematics might get by preventing 
certain concepts from reification. In particular, since mathematical reasoning involves 
the notion of infinity anyway it is quite appropriate for this science to develop a 
calculus of infinities rather than keep the notion of infinity somewhere at the limit of 
the scope of the discipline without a properly mathematical treatment. The history of 
mathematics of last two centuries provides numerous examples of successful 
reification of "ideal elements" of different kinds. Think of ideal points in projective 
geometry, for example. 
2. Language of Categories and Categorical Foundations
Unlike set theory category theory has been designed as a language to begin with and 
only later has been proposed as a foundations by Lawvere and his followers. The notion 
of category has been first explicitly introduced by Eilenberg and MacLane in their 
(1945) paper as a purely auxiliary device, and until works of Grothendieck and his 
school in late fifties, which made an essential use of category theory in algebraic 
geometry, nobody would consider this theory as anything more than a convenient 
system of notation. In his classical (1971) MacLane writes:
Category theory starts with the observation that many properties of mathematical 
systems can be unified and simplified by a presentation with diagrams of arrows. 
(MacLane 1971, p.1)
Such presentation is often possible because most of mathematical concepts come 
with a corresponding notion of map (otherwise called transformation or morphism) 
between tokens falling under a given concept. For example, maps between sets are 
functions, maps between topological spaces are continuous transformations, maps 
between groups are group homomorphisms. Such maps are composable in the usual 
way corresponding to the common intuition behind the notion of transformation. The 
mathematical notion of category makes this common intuition explicit assuming 
associativity of composition of maps and existence of identity map for each object. 
Using the "language of arrows" we may think of, say, natural numbers, not just as of 
"bare set" N = {0, 1, 2, 3, ...} but as a category where numbers are provided with 
succession maps:
0 --> 1 --> 2 --> 3 --> ...
Identifying number n with isomorphism classes of sets having exactly n elements and 
considering classes of maps between these sets as morphisms between numbers one 
gets a richer category comprising mexpn  different morphisms from any number n to 
any number m , in particular nexpn morphisms to each number n to itself n! of which 
are isomorphisms. All these notions can be rather easily cooked set-theoretically; in 
more involved constructions such a set-theoretic regression is also often (but not 
always) possible but the advantage of using the language of arrows can be much more 
important. I shall not talk about specific mathematical matters here but remark that 
category theory like set theory allowed for reification of certain concepts which 
earlier could not be reified. Consider the concept of set for example. The extension S 
of this concept is the set of all sets. That S  turns to be a contradictory notion is a 
part of the problem but not yet the whole problem (notice that the notion of infinite 
set before Cantor was believed to be contradicory too). Another part of the problem 
is that S doesn't have interesting properties to be studied and apparently doesn't 
allow for further non-trivial constructions. However as far as all sets are taken 
together with all maps between them the situation changes. The category of sets  Set 
does have interesting specific properties distinguishing it from other categories and 
also allows for non-trivial constructions (like that of topos). This clearly shows that 
Set is a better embodiment of the general concept of set than S . The situation is 
similar in the case of the concept of group, topological space and many others (see 
paragraph 6 below). So category theory allows for reification of concepts when set 
theory doesn't. 
However useful category theory might be what has been said so far has no bearing on 
the problem of foundations. One may assume standard set-theoretic foundations and 
then construe the language of categories upon it. But why not to think (in particular to 
think about sets) category-theoretically to start with? The first systematic attempts 
of this kind has been made by Lawvere in his thesis of 1963 and papers of 1964 and 
1966 based on this thesis. In these works Lawvere introduced categories using formal 
axiomatic method just like Zermelo and Fraenkel did this with sets. This amounts to 
the following: objects and morphisms are taken as primitives objects holding three 
primitive relations with intended meaning "domain of", "codomain of",  and "composition 
of" plus the identity relation. Categorical objects and categorical morphisms are 
treated as belonging to the same type since every categorical object is formally 
identified with its identity morphism. Lawvere himself avoids speaking about objects 
and relations in this context taking first purely syntactical viewpoint and after listing 
the appropriate axioms saying :
By a category we of course understand (intuitively) any structure which is an 
interpretation of the elementary theory of abstract categories ... (1966, p.4)
In his (1964) Lawvere adjoins to his axiomatic category theory a number of additional 
axioms making an abstract category "into" the category of sets so that
There is essentially only one category which satisfies these ... axioms ... , namely the 
category S of sets and mappings. (1964, p. 1506)  
Remind that in order to use set theory as foundations one needs "abstract" sets 
rather than "concrete" sets like sets of points, numbers, etc. What these abstract 
sets are sets of? Cantor's answer is the following: abstract sets are sets of "pure 
units" ("lauter Einsen"). Another answer has been later given by Zermelo: abstract 
sets are sets of sets. This latter answer is obviously more economical conceptually. 
For a similar reason Lawvere put forward a theory of categories of categories (but 
not just a general theory of "concrete" categories like categories of sets, groups, 
etc...) and suggested it as foundations of mathematics (Lawvere 1966).  
While in these early papers Lawvere sticks to formal axiomatic method and the 
corresponding notion of foundations in his more recent paper of 2003 this author 
takes a different approach and opts for a different notion of foundations understood 
... in a common-sense way rather than in the speculative way of the Bolzano-Frege-
Peano-Russell tradition. (2003 p. ??) 
This change of Lawvere's view seems me remarkable. The intimate link between sets 
and formal axiomatic method stressed in the previous paragraph suggests that sets 
cannot be replaced in their foundational role by categories or anything else unless one 
continue to use this method and applies the corresponding notion of foundation. This, 
in my view, explains why the idea of making categories into foundations finally led 
Lawvere to the refusal from the formal method. But Lawvere's reference to common 
sense hardly solve the problem either. To get rid of  "speculative foundations" one 
needs a new method of theory-building. In his (2003) Lawvere doesn't aim at general 
solution of this problem but gives a concrete example of how categorical foundations 
may look like.  The principle aim of my paper is to describe a general method of 
theory-building suggested by category theory. I shall call this new method categorical 
and distinguish it from formal method. Formal views on mathematics and science are 
usually opposed to more traditional views according to which mathematics and 
sciences always assume certain "substances" like "number" or "magnitude" as their 
subject-matters. In today's philosophy of mathematics formal view is associated with 
mathematical structuralism. I say that categorical method goes beyond formal method 
(and beyond structuralism) in order to stress that my proposal has nothing to do with 
the traditional substantialism. As we shall see the mathematical notion of category 
suggests something genuinely new with respect to the traditional concepts of form 
and substance.     
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. In the next section I stress a distinctive 
feature of formal axiomatic method (seen against traditional axiomatic method), which 
concerns the notion of interpretation  relevant to mathematics. Then I argue that 
formal axiomatic method doesn't provide an adequate treatment of mathematical 
interpretation and introduce the notion of categorical method which does this. Then I 
analyse some logical aspects of categorical method and conclude with general 
epistemological arguments in its favour.
3. Formal Axiomatic Method in The Nutshell
A today's mathematical student can read in various textbooks that formal axiomatic 
method invented by Hilbert is nothing but a perfectioned version of the traditional 
axiomatic method known since Euclid. True, Hilbert certainly had Euclid's Elements in 
mind writing his Grundlagen, so his method can be rightly seen as a modification of 
Euclid's. However I don't think that the description of this modification as 
perfectioning sheds a lot of light on it. To see clearly what is specific for formal 
axiomatic method as distinguished from more traditional versions of axiomatic method 
a historical regression seems me helpful. Soon after the publication of Hilbert's 
Grundlagen in 1899 Frege sent Hilbert a letter (the precise date is missing) containing 
a severe criticism of Hilbert's approach. Frege's had the following traditional 
understanding of axiomatic method in mind. A given theory starts with axioms, which 
are truths taken for granted. These non-demonstrable truths are truths about certain 
objects. The theory proceeds with inferences from the axioms made according rules 
of inference, which must be also assumed. As a matter of course for any given theory 
meanings of all terms used in its axioms and further inferences must be unequivocally 
fixed once and for all. This general epistemological view dating back to Aristotle has 
been recently called classical model of science (Jong&Betti, forthcoming).   
Frege pointed to Hilbert that his Grundlagen falls short of meeting the requirements 
just mentioned and in particular the unequivocality requirement. Here is a quotation 
from Hilbert's reply to Frege where Hilbert explains his new method in the nutshell:
"You say that my concepts, e.g. "point", "between", are not unequivocally fixed <...>. 
But surely it is self-evident that every theory is merely a framework or schema of 
concepts together with their necessary relations to one another, and that basic 
elements can be construed as one pleases. If I think of my points as some system or 
other of things, e.g. the system of love, of law, or of chimney sweeps <...> and then 
conceive of all my axioms as relations between these things, then my theorems, e.g. 
the Pythagorean one, will hold of these things as well. In other words, each and every 
theory can always be applied to infinitely many systems of basic elements. For one 
merely has to apply a univocal and reversible one-to-one transformation and stipulate 
that the axioms for the transformed things be correspondingly similar. Indeed this is 
frequently applied, for example in the principle of duality, etc." (cit. by Frege 1971, 
p.13, italic mine).
Since a point is allowed to "be" (or to "be thought of as") a "system of love and 
chimney sweeps" (or a beer mug according to another popular Hilbert's saying) - and all 
this within one and the same theory  - Frege's notion of axiomatic method is certainly 
no longer relevant. But let's look for a serious mathematical reason behind Hilbert's 
colourful rhetoric. In the end of the quotation Hilbert refers to the duality principle in 
projective geometry. Given a true proposition of this theory, which involves straight 
lines and points, one may formally exchange terms "line" and "point" and get another 
true proposition. (This doesn't reduce to the trivial remark that one may call lines 
"points" and call points "lines" without changing the given theoretical structure since 
the original proposition remains true as it stands.) This suggests the following idea: a 
given mathematical object can be occasionally "thought of" or "interpreted" as another 
mathematical object. In particular in projective geometry one may "think of lines as 
points and think of points as lines". Such a liberal treatment of mathematical objects 
is common in today's mathematics. In the end of 19th century it was not yet common 
but a number of important examples were already around (I elaborate on one such 
example in the next section). Hilbert's Grundlagen provides a justification for this 
apparently careless conceptual game. The problem Hilbert addressed can be 
formulated as follows: How to construe a mathematical concept, which can be 
occasionally "interpreted" as another concept?; How to formulate a theory in which 
basic concepts are defined only "up to interpretation"? Hilbert's answer is roughly this. 
One should first conceive of mathematical objects as bare "things" (possibly of 
different types) standing in certain relations to each other, and then describe these 
relations stipulating their formal properties as axioms. Any "system of things", which 
hold relations satisfying the axioms would be a model of the theory. 
As Hilbert makes it explicit in the quoted passage he thinks about re-interpretations 
of theories as "reversible one-to-one transformations", i.e. as isomorphisms. Hilbert's 
clearness often absent in later expositions of formal method allows one to see its 
limits: mutual interpretations of mathematical theories are, generally, not reversible. 
To build a theory "up to isomorphism" is not the same thing as to build a theory "up to 
interpretation". For interpretations are, generally, not isomorphisms. Let me now 
demonstrate this fact using a historical example, which was already available to 
Hilbert. 
4. Irreversible Interpretations
Non-Euclidean geometries emerged in mathematics of 19th century as a result of at 
least two different developments. The first started in Ancient times and culminated 
with (Bolyai 1832) and (Lobachevsky 1837). These mathematicians like their 
predecessors tried to prove the 5-th Postulate of Euclid's Elements (the "Axiom of 
Parallels") by getting a contradiction from its negations but at certain point changed 
their attitude and came to a conviction that they were exploring a new vast territory 
rather than approaching the desired dead end. The second line of development, which I 
associate with the names of Gauss and Riemann, was relatively recent. Gauss had a 
genuinely new insight on the old "problem of parallels" guessing a link with geometry of 
curve surfaces. This allowed his pupil Riemann to build a new generalised concept of 
geometrical space (Riemanean manifold), which still serves us as the best 
mathematical description of the physical space-time (in General Relativity). 
The two lines of development were brought together by Beltrami in his two prominent 
papers (1868) and  (1868-69). Anachronistically speaking, in his Saggio of 1868 
Beltrami gave a 3D Euclidean model of plane Lobachevskian geometry. More precisely it 
was only a partical model where finite segments of geodesics of a surface named by 
Beltrami pseudo-sphere represented straight line segments of Lobachevskian plane. 
But Beltrami didn't have the notions of formal theory and model in mind. He first 
thought he discovered what the Lobachevskian plane was indeed: he believed it was the 
pseudo-sphere. However this conclusion was not quite satisfactory even in Beltrami's 
own eyes. He didn't notice that his model for plane Lobachevskian gometry was only 
partial (this was first noticed by Helmholz in 1870, see Kline 1972) but he saw that 
Lobachevskian 3D geometry couldn't be treated in the same way. So he looked for a 
better solution. He found it after reading Riemann's (1854) and presented in his Teoria 
of 1869: Lobachevskian space is a Riemanean manifold of constant negative 
curvature. This holds for spaces of any number of dimensions. 
The latter solution apparently makes the talk of interpretation no longer necessary. 
Let's however see how the result of Saggio looks from the point of view of Teoria: a 2-
manifold of constant negative curvature is partially embeddable into 3D Euclidean 
space (which is another Riemanean manifold). So we have here two manifolds and a 
map, which can still be tought of as interpretation as suggested by Saggio. The point I 
want to stress is that this map is not an isomorphism, it is not reversible. It restricts 
to an isomorphism (a part of Lobachevskian plane is isomorphic to a part of Euclidean 
space) but the whole construction cannot be conceived on this restricted basis alone: 
the map in question is a map between two spaces (manifolds) but not between their 
"parts". As a surface in Euclidean space the pseudo-sphere cannot be "carved out" of 
this space. One may remark that we are talking about a map between spaces 
(manifolds) but not about an interpretation between theories, and so this example is 
not quite relevant to the issue discussed in the previous section. But it is obvious that 
however the notion of theory is construed in this case the situation remains 
asymmetric: while Lobachevskian plane geometry can (modulo needed reservations) be 
explained in or "translated into" terms of Euclidean 3D geometry the converse is not 
the case. Observe that the mere existence of interpretation f :A-->B  of theory A  in 
terms of another theory B  and a backward interpretation g:B-->A  is not sufficient for 
considering f as reversible:  f  and g should "cancel" each other for it. To give a 
precise definition one needs to stipulate appropriate "identical interpretations" idA, idB 
(which leave A,B correspondingly "as they are") and then require  fg=idA and gf=idB, 
where fg and gf denote composition interpretations (written here in the direct 
geometrical order). This standard categorical definition of isomorphism often allows 
for but doesn't require thinking of it in terms of set-theoretic "correspondences" 
between elements. Hereafter talking about isomorphisms I shall understand this notion 
in the sense of the above definition. 
A similar point can be made about arithmetical models of plane Euclidean and other 
geometries used by Hilbert in Grundlagen. Perhaps one can indeed imagine geometrical 
points as usual dots, "systems of loves" or beer mugs indiscriminately. But 
representation of points by pairs of real numbers (or pairs of elements of another 
appropriate algebraic field) is a different matter. Unlike dots and beer mugs numbers 
are mathematical objects on their own rights belonging to a different mathematical 
theory, namely arithmetic. "Translations" of geometrical theories into arithmetic used 
by Hilbert are obviously non-reversible: they allow for translation of geometrical 
theories into arithmetic terms but not the other way round. Hilbert certainly saw this. 
He didn't mean to say that geometry and arithmetic seen from a higher viewpoint turn 
to be the same theory; actually he considered a possibility of reduction of geometry to 
arithmetic. Nevertheless he thought about this translation as an isomorphism, namely 
an isomorphism between basic geometrical objects and relations, one the one hand, 
and specially prepared arithmetical constructions, on the other hand. But such 
constructions obviously cannot be made outside an appropriate arithmetical theory. 
As far as this "target" arithmetical theory is wholly taken into consideration (as it 
must be!) the translation in question doesn't look like like an isomorphism any longer. 
We see that the example of projective duality mentioned by Hilbert (to leave alone 
"systems of love, of law or of chimney sweeps") is special and cannot be used as a 
model for treating the notion of interpretation in mathematics in the general case.  
One may perhaps remark that the point I am making is obvious but trivial or at best 
merely technical: the categorical notion of morphism allows indeed for a better 
treatment of interpretations between theories but doesn't essentially change 
anything. Let me now show that in fact it does. What might look like a minor technical 
amendment suggests a revision of the whole idea of "formal" mathematics and formal 
theory-building in general. (Endnote 1)
5. Forms, Categories and Structuralism
Many traditional mathematical concepts have the following property: all items falling 
under a given concept are isomorphic or, in other words, are defined "up to 
isomorphism". I shall call such concepts form-concepts or simply forms. The colloquial 
expression "up to isomorphism" apparently involves a systematic ambiguity between 
identity and isomorphism but it doesn't matter here. Think about any Euclidean 
geometrical form (shape) like that of  circle. A circle allows for (Euclidean) motions 
and scalings. I leave aside the tricky question of whether these transformations 
preserve identities of circles or rather associate with given circles some other circles 
(see Rodin, forthcoming). I only point here to the fact that all (Euclidean) circles are 
isomorphic in the sense that for any given pair of circles there always exist a 
reversible transformation (motion, scaling or their composition) transforming one 
circle into the other. Through an appropriate modification of the class of admissible 
transformations one may modify a given form-concept. Thinking about a circle up to 
reversible continuous transformation one gets a more general topological notion of 
circle. Klein (1872) first put forward the idea of description of geometrical spaces 
through group-theoretic properties of transformations available in these spaces. This 
approach requires all transformations in question to be reversible (to be 
isomorphisms) for otherwise they don't form a group by composition. 
For a further example consider the traditional notion of (natural) number conceived as 
a "shared form" of isomorphic finite sets. (Number n is a form shared by all sets of 
exactly n elements; any pair of such sets allows for a one-to-one correspondence 
between their elements.) The colloquial notion of "algebraic form" provides yet another 
class of elementary examples of form-concepts. Take expression like (x+y)expn. All 
expressions obtained from this one through any admissible substitution of symbols 
x,y, n by some other variables, constants or algebraic expressions are told to share 
the "same algebraic form". Isomorphisms associated with this algebraic form are such 
substitutions (notice the reversibility of substitutions). For more modern examples of 
form-concepts think about any concept build up as "structured set". Think, for 
example, about "the" group of plane Euclidean motions already mentioned. Obviously 
one can take as many isomorphic "copies" of this group as one likes. The mathematical 
notion of form (and the notion of group of symmetry associated with it) plays a major 
role in physics and other sciences (for a popular account see Weyl 1952). 
The above examples are so various that one might think that in fact all mathematical 
concepts are form-concepts. This view has been held by Plato who, however, made a 
distinction between mathematical forms and forms strictu sensu. In todays philosophy 
of mathematics this view is known under the name of mathematical structuralism. 
Mathematical structuralism exists in a number of different versions but that 
structures are things determined up to isomorphism seems to be a common 
assumption. Understandably Hilbert is often referred to as one of founding farthers of 
mathematical structuralism (Hellman, forthcoming). 
But the view according to which all mathematical concepts are form-concepts is 
obviously wrong. Think about the general concept of group - not any particular group 
like the group of Euclidean motions but the concept of group as such. There are 
certainly isomorphic groups but not all groups are isomorphic. So the general concept 
of group is not determined up to isomorphism. Hence it is not a form-concept. 
Similarly general concepts of set, natural number, etc. are not form-concepts. 
This sounds like a trivial point. However one may still argue that all mathematical 
objects are instances of form-concepts. However important the general concept of 
group might be one arguably doesn't need in mathematics anything like "general group" 
over and above all particular groups. Since these particular groups are all form-
concepts the structuralist view remains plausible. But the situation can be seen 
differently. Notice that like in the case of any "particular" (that is, specified up to 
isomorphism) group there is a notion of transformation associated with the general 
concept of group. I mean the notion of group homomorphism (I shall explain it shortly). 
Homomorphisms are non-reversible (except when they are isomorphisms!). One might 
say that the general concept of group is determined "up to homomorphism" like the 
group of plane Euclidean transformations (or any other particular group) is determined 
up to isomorphism. But a better way to put is this: groups with group homomorphisms 
make a category. The category of groups is evidently something "over and above" all 
particular groups that it comprises; it has properties, which cannot be detected 
through studying particular groups. Importantly the concept of category of groups is 
not a form-concept as we shall see. The same holds for the category of sets, etc. 
By analogy with form-concepts I shall speak about category-concepts. General 
concepts of sets, group, manifold, topological space or the general concept of 
category itself are category-concepts. This means that items falling under such 
concepts and their associated transformations make categories (in particular all 
possible categories make the category of categories, see (Lawvere 1966)). The notion 
of category-concept is more general than that of form-concept: any form-concept is 
a special case of category-concept where all morphisms are isomorphisms. 
(Awodey 1996) and some other people argue that the notion of category is a typical 
example of structure , which appears to be a different name for (or at least a special 
case of) what I call here form. Since the general concept of category is instantiated 
by sets, groups, etc., etc., an abstract category can be colloquially called a "common 
conceptual form" of all these things . However this is misleading and, as far as one 
assumes the proposed understanding of the notion of form, simply wrong. For the 
categories in question are not isomorph. They can be mapped to each other by suitable 
functors but these functors are never reversible. So it is misleading to interpret the 
fact that sets, groups, etc. all make categories in the sense that all these thing share 
a "form of category". The erroneous thinking about categories as forms is, in my view, 
responsible for the infamous description of category theory as "abstract nonsense". 
6. Transformations Instead of Relations? 
The notion of transformation can be formulated in mathematics most easily in the 
case when transformed objects are construed a la Bourbaki as "structured sets". For 
"bare" ("non-structured") sets we have the notion of set isomorphism as one-to-one 
correspondence between their elements and a more general notion of morphism 
between (or "transformation of") sets, which are called functions: each element of the 
domain is sent to a certain (unique) element of co-domain. Since two different 
elements of the domain can be sent to the same element of the codomain morphisms  
(transformations) of sets are, generally speaking, non-reversible. When a given set is 
equipped with a certain structure making it into a group or something else the 
permissible transformations are those transformations of underlying sets (that is, 
functions), which are said to "preserve" the corresponding structure. For example the 
group structure on a given set is a binary operation defined for elements of this sets 
and verifying certain axioms. Given two groups G and G' construed as just explained 
with corresponding group operations + and * think about function  f: G-->G'. It is said 
to preserve the group structure (and hence to be a group homomorphism) iff 
(GS):  f(x+y)=f(x)*f(y) .
When f is reversible groups G and G' are called isomorphic or "identical up to 
isomorphism". Such groups cannot be distinguished by their group-theoretic 
properties. However (GS) may hold in the non-reversible case as well. Then the 
colloquial talk of "preservation of structure" becomes rather misleading. Consider the 
case when G' consists of only one element 1 (such that 1+1=1). In this case 
homomorphism f "destroys" the structure of G  rather than preserves it! A better way 
to put (GS) into words is to say that in the general case homomorphisms respect the 
group structure (even if they destroy it).  
Things work similarly with all "structured sets" (with different conditions amounting to 
"preservation" or "respect" of the corresponding structure). This points to an 
important link between category theory and the notion of mathematical structure (and 
hence with Mathematical Structuralism). However I see this link as historical rather 
than theoretic. For the notion of transformation in fact doesn't depend of the set-
theoretic background involved in definitions of morphisms of groups, topological 
spaces and other concepts construed as structured sets. This is true in the case 
when transformations are conceived "naively" as well as in the case when the notion of 
transformation acquires a technical definition other than set-theoretic. The notion of 
geometrical transformation came about long before set theory; in particular the 
notion of geometrical motion is implicit already in Euclid's Elements (think about 
Euclid's notion of congruence).  Klein in his Erlangen Program made geometrical 
transformations into foundations and treated them algebraically using the notion of 
(algebraic) group. In this latter context the notion of transformation could be hardly 
called naive any longer. Finally the notion of transformation or morphism became a 
basic notion of category theory. Although in the early days of category theory all 
important examples of morphisms were morphisms of structured sets MacLane and 
Eilenberg realised it from the very beginning that certain morphisms are not 
"structural" in this sense. Two basic examples of "non-structural" categories which 
immediately suggest themselves are the following: (1) group construed as a category 
with just one object and such that all its morphisms are isomorphisms; (2) preoder 
construed as a category having no more than one morphism between any (ordered) 
pair of its objects. The categories just mentioned shouldn't be confused with 
categories of "all" groups and "all" preorders correspondingly since (1) is an "individual" 
group and (2) is an "individual" preorders. But category of "all" groups and category of 
"all" preorders could be construed by taking, correspondingly, (1) and (2) as their 
objects.  Groups and preorders, of course, "are" structured sets in the sense that 
they can be construed as such things. However as we have just seen they can be also 
construed "purely categorically", so their morphisms are not supposed to "preserve" 
or "respect" any structure.  However trivial may be the translation of notions of group 
and preorder from the set-theoretic into the categorical language it clearly shows 
that the notion of morphism is more general than that of structure-preserving 
morphism.
Let's now go back to formal axiomatic method. Its basic idea can be expressed by this 
slogan: describe mathematical objects in terms of formal properties of their relations. 
The slogan of categorical method reads slightly differently: describe mathematical 
objects in terms of categorical properties of their transformations. The principle 
assumption behind the categorical approach is that transformations of mathematical 
objects (including both isomorphisms and non-reversible transformations) indeed 
essentially characterise these objects. 
A comparison between the two methods suggests an analogy between relations and 
morphisms. One can say indeed that morphisms "relate" objects to each other in a 
way. As far as this claim is taken in the general philosophical sense it sounds 
reasonable. But it is in odds with the standard technical notion of relation as function 
sending tuples of  individuals (relata) to truth values. For morphism f:A-->B sending 
object A to object B is just another mathematical object, which prima facie has nothing 
to do with truth values. Further, in a given binary relation R(x,y) arguments (relata) 
x,y can be, generally speaking, replaced by some other arguments x',y' so that R(x',y') 
again makes sense (i.e. is true or false). This allows for thinking about R  as 
"structural relationships" (between its relata) appearing in Hellmann's official definition 
of structuralism as 
a view about the subject matter of mathematics according to which what matters are 
structural relationships in abstraction from the intrinsic nature of the related objects 
But for morphism f:A-->B nothing similar is possible. The fact that object A is domain 
of f and object B is codomain of f characterises f  essentially: there is no sense in 
which f may survive replacement of A, B by some other objects A', B'.
These observations point to a gap between the general philosophical intuition behind 
the concept of relation and the standard logical notion of relation just mentioned. The 
intuition says that morphisms are relation-like while within the standard logical 
formalism they should be treated as objects. This can be seen in Lawvere's early 
papers of 1964 and 1966 already mentioned where categories are treated as classes 
of morphisms with relations "domain of", "codomain of" and "composition of". Let me 
now provide a further argument showing that doing category theory formally (i.e. 
using formal axiomatic method) is not a good idea.      
   
7. Categories and Categoricity. 
As the above quote from Hilbert clearly shows he thinks of a formal theory as 
construed up to isomorphism of its interpretations. But what guaranties that a given 
theory like that of Grundlagen is indeed formal in this sense, i.e. that all its models are 
in fact isomorphic? The desired property has been called by Veblen (1904) 
categoricity. This term has nothing to do with category theory. 
When Hilbert was preparing his Grundlagen for publication he apparently didn't yet see 
the problem. He discovered it about the time of the first publication of Grundlagen. In 
his lecture Ueber den Zahlbegriff delivered in 1899 and published in 1900 Hilbert first 
introduced an "axiom of completeness" (Vollstandigkeitsaxiom) requiring from any 
model of a given theory (this time it was arithmetic) this maximal property: given 
model M  satisfying the rest of the axioms one cannot obtain another model satisfying 
the same axioms by extending M with new elements. In the second and following 
editions of Grundlagen Hilbert used a similar axiom under the same name. Hilbert's 
Vollstandigkeitsaxiom implies categoricity (although the converse is obviously not the 
case). From the point of view of today's model theory this axiom looks very dubios if 
not plainly "wrong": Hilbert's account doesn't provide any reason why a model with the 
desired property should exist (in any appropriate sense of "exist") but apparently 
relies onto the intuition which suggests that the intended model (i.e. "usual" 
geometrical space) has this property. This is a very shaky ground indeed. The 
standard Tarskian model theory doesn't allow for a model with the required maximal 
property (because of "upward" Skolem-Lowenheim's theorem: given that a theory has 
an infinite model it has other models in higher cardinalities). So the 
Vollstandigkeitsaxiom turned to be incompatible with later model theory. Since the 
notion of categoricity has been formulated by Veblen the idea that this property can 
be stipulated by a fiat has been largely abandoned.
For the reason just explained categoricity is commonly viewed as a desired property of 
formal theories. However in 20-th century people have learnt to be tolerant to the 
lack of categoricity. For Zermelo-Frenskel axiomatic set theory (ZF), Peano Arithmetic 
(PA) and some other theories commonly viewed as important turned to be non-
categorical. To preclude the right of these theories to be qualified as formal on this 
ground would apparently mean to go too far. To save the situation philosophers 
invented the notion of "intended model", that is of model chosen among others on an 
intuitive basis. Isn't this ironic that such a blunt appeal to intuition is made in the core 
of formal axiomatic method? I'm agree with F. Davey who recently argued that "no-one 
has ever been able to explain exactly what they mean by intended model". (FOM, 13 Oct 
2006). Other people question the categoricity requirement. Asks R. Lindauer: "Why 
rule out non-standard models of 1st-Order PA? What's wrong with having other 
models? Why should we be making our model-world smaller and not larger?" (FOM, 27 
Oct 2006). 
I believe that the lack of categoricity of theories like ZF and PA is indeed a serious 
flaw because the lack of categoricity undermines the very idea of formal theory. At 
the same time I agree with Lindauer and other people who think that the pursuit of 
categoricity is misleading. These two claims might seem to contradict each other but 
they don't: instead of forcing categoricity or looking for a philosophical excuse of the 
lack of categoricity of formal theories I suggest to change the method of theory-
building and the corresponding notion of theory. As far as non-reversible morphisms 
are treated on the same footing with isomorphisms the pursuit of categoricity has no 
sense any longer. Trying to describe a model of a given theory "up to arbitrary 
morphism" rather than up to isomorphism one may get a category of models which has 
"good" categorical properties making it "well-manageable". In the following paragraph I 
provide some details of how this can be achieved. As we shall see the categorical 
approach undermines the usual distinction between a (formal) theory and its models: in 
the new context a theory can be naturally seen as one of the models having this 
specific property that it "generates" all the others. This is hardly surprising given that 
the notion of formal theory (as distinguished from its models) requires categoricity in 
Veblen's sense.  
A great advantage of formal axiomatic method is that it provides a clear idea about 
the role and the place of logic of in theories built by this method (albeit details can 
always be a subject of philosophical discussion). Talking about categorical method as 
an alternative to formal method we cannot avoid this important issue either. In the 
next paragraph I shall briefly review classical and formal notions of logic, and then 
develop a notion of categorical logic and show its role in categorical method of theory-
building.     
8. Formalising Logic
Traditionally logic is conceived as a general theory of reasoning independent of any 
particular subject matter one may reason about. On Aristotle's account logic is closely 
related to ontology. In particular, Aristotle treats the logical law of non-contradiction 
as a fundamental ontological principle, and his so-called perfect syllogism reflects the 
structure of entity (as Aristotle understands it). Logical truths are grounded upon 
ontological truths even if the former do not coincide with the latter. There is, of 
course, a sense in which Aristotle's logic could be called formal. For it captures and 
studies common forms shared by various reasonings about different matters. These 
forms are called logical forms; perfect syllogism is a typical example. However other 
sciences like biology proceed similarly: biology captures forms shared by different 
organisms and so brings about the notion of biological form (differently called "form of 
life" or "living form"). However biology can be hardly called a formal science on this 
ground. This shows that the notion of being formal relevant to modern logic is 
di f ferent.
The Hilbertian notion of formal theory is that of  "framework or schema of concepts 
together with their necessary relations to one another" taken in abstraction from its 
possible "basic elements", that is, technically speaking, from its possible 
interpretations. Formal logic in the usual today's understanding of this expression is 
formal in the same sense. This gives the idea of distinction between logical syntax and 
logical semantics which is not found in the traditional logic. "Formal" means here 
"syntactic". As Carnap puts this
The task of formalisation of any theory ... belongs to syntax, not to semantics. 
(1947, Preface)
 
However there is a problem here, which make it difficult to apply the notion of formal 
theory to logic. Remind that not all terms used in axioms of Hibert's Grundlagen have 
variable meanings. Meanings of terms "and", "or", "exist" and of some others are fixed; 
such terms form the logical vocabulary of the given theory, and the (maximal) 
fragment of the theory which involves no other terms but logical can be identified with 
logic. So unlike geometrical theories themselves their underlying logic is fixed and 
doesn't allow for different interpretations. But this means that one cannot distinguish 
here between formal and interpreted logic or between logical syntax and logical 
semantics. However with this latter distinction we  loose the modern notion of formal 
logic.  
Actually this notion is apparently absent in Hilbert. The idea behind his Grundlagen is to 
base mathematics in general and geometry in particular on logical rather than intuitive 
or other grounds. Discovery of non-Euclidean geometries and some other 
developments in mathematics led many people to the belief that since the traditional 
mathematical intuition proved unreliable logic remained the only firm foundations 
available for mathematics. (Nagel 1939) provides a thorough historical analysis of 
mathematics of 19th century showing where this logicist view on mathematics stems 
from (Endnote 2). Hilbert's Grundlagen showed how this general approach can be 
realised in practice.  A formal theory in Hilbert's sense is a "logical skeleton" (or 
"logical form" liberally understood) shared by a class of traditional so-called "naive" 
mathematical theories. But logic itself on this account is not formal in anything like 
the same sense. Applying the notion of formal theory just given to logic one would 
need to speak of "logical skeleton of logic" which is at least unclear and at most 
senseless. 
Carnap and other promoters of the idea of formal (or "formalised" logic) largely 
disregarded this philosophical difficulty and applied formal or "syntactic" method to 
logic itself, introducing the nowadays standard distinction between logical syntax and 
logical semantics. Instead of saying that in formal theories of the type of Grundlagen 
logic is not a subject of interpretation these people (as well as many today's 
professors of logic after them) would say that logical terms get interpreted together 
with non-logical terms but unlike the latter they are always interpreted in the same 
way (i.e. logical terms are invariant under all possible interpretations). Unless the 
class of "all interpretations" is precisely determined this move seems me purely 
rhetorical, and if such a class is determined then the notion of logicicity becomes 
relational (dependent of the given class of interpretations). Anyway this doesn't solve 
the problem, which is the following. 
The initial hope that logic unlike geometry will always be rigidly fixed on the pain of 
absurdity turned to be futile and logic ramified into multiple systems just like earlier 
did geometry. Formalisation of logic played an important role in this development 
because it allowed to treat systems of logic on equal footing with systems of 
geometry or algebraic systems. However since the assumption about rigidity of logic is 
given up the whole idea of formal approach (at least in Hilbert's sense) is shaken, so it 
becomes rather unclear what is meant by "formal" logic except that this kind of logic 
is symbolic and mathematical. What kind of new philosophy of logic is needed to 
replace Hilbert's (or Frege's) logicism in order to cope with these developments 
remains an open question. Most philosophers working today in logic share Hilbert's 
weak logicism according to which logic has to do with foundations of mathematics and 
of other sciences. At the same time only few of them if any hold the old-fashioned 
view according to which there is only one "true" system of logic. As the above analysis 
shows the two parts of the popular view are hardly compatible with each other. 
Categorical logic suggests a solution of this problem through a revision of formal 
axiomatic method and more broadly - of formal approach. In order to show this 
solution I shall first develop a speculative notion of categorical logic as a generalisation 
of formal logic, and then point to some technical developments supporting this 
speculative notion.
9. Categorical Logic
Both traditional Aristotelian logic and modern formal logic hinge on the notion of logical 
form. What kind of forms are logical forms is a difficult question which I shall not now 
try to answer here. Let's see instead what happens to logic when the notion of form is 
upgraded to that of category. Remind that categories unlike forms, generally 
speaking, don't allow for a straightforward abstraction: given a class of balls one may 
think about them "up to isomorphism" and stipulate The Ball as their shared abstract 
form but nothing similar works when objects of a given class make a category. So a 
categorical system of logic unlike formal logic cannot be anything like a self-standing 
structure occasionally applied in this or that particular context. Instead it must be 
"internal" or "intrinsic" with respect to a given category playing the role of such 
context. This rises the question of universality of categorical logic: Is this indeed 
appropriate to give the title of logic to something, which applies to a particular 
category rather than to everything? Let me make three remarks concerning this 
question. First, nothing prevents one to conceive of "everything" as a category (rather 
than as a class). This idea is behind (Lawvere 1966) "The Category of Categories" 
approach. Personally I'm not sympathetic with this idea. Actually I consider the "local" 
character of categorical logic as its advantage rather than otherwise. The second 
remark is that the idea of "local" or "regional" logic as a notion of a system of logic 
designed for some specific purposes has been around already during few decades, and 
it better fits today's technical developments in logic than the traditional idea of the 
universal logic.  The third remark is that in the categorical setting the notion of 
"regional" or "local" logic can better cope with the following important objection: 
Ramification of logic brakes the rational thought into a number of incompatible 
domains and this contradicts the whole idea of rationality. The usual response to this 
problem is the suggestion to find a weak system U of universal logic such that regional 
logics could be seen as specifications of U in corresponding local contexts. 
Alternatively one may challenge the assumption about the unity of rationality on 
philosophical grounds. Categorical logic allows for a different solution, namely it 
provides means for translation between different local logics. Such translation doesn't 
intervene here as a new external principle since what I call here local or regional logic is 
construed in the categorical setting in terms of morphisms which can be naturally 
viewed as translations. One would still need, of course, some universal principles, 
namely the general principles of category theory. What makes the difference is this: in 
the categorical setting universal principles of rationality are principles of translation 
rather than formal principles imposing universal forms of reasoning indifferent to its 
content. One may argue that general principles of translation I'm talking about are 
themselves formal but this is, in my view, an abuse of the language. As far as one 
tries to be precise about the meaning of "formal" it becomes clear that the argument 
is wrong. Importantly categorical logic assumes the possibility of multiple local logics 
to begin with, so that no counterpart of the aforementioned problem about 
formalisation of logic arises in the categorical context. 
Let's now see how this speculative notion of categorical logic can be realised 
technically. There are several different ways to "do logic" with categories but the 
most relevant in the present context is apparently the so-called topos logic. The 
notion of topos is of a geometrical origin; it was a discovery of Lawvere that this 
notion can be introduced axiomatically through an appropriate specification of the 
abstract notion of category. It turns out that given a topos one may associate with it 
a logical calculus called "internal language". Then the given topos can be viewed as a 
geometric model of this calculus. However a more suggestive view on this situation is 
the converse one: the given topos has certain specific "logical properties" which 
determine its "internal logic".  This gives the idea of "reasoning in a topos"; reasonings 
in different toposes can be always compared through morphisms (functors) between 
these toposes (which can be of different sorts). Remark that the view just mentioned 
(colloquially known as "toposophy") is in odds with the usual (weak) logicism which 
requires to "fix logic first". For according to toposophy logic is an element (or perhaps 
an aspect) of the overall construction of topos, which doesn't have an epistemic 
priority with respect to the rest of this construction.  This rises anew the traditional 
philosophical issue about first principles. But let me now turn this discussion in a more 
technical mode. 
Technically speaking the problem is that the general idea of categorical logic doesn't 
provide by itself any clue of  how it could be used for theory-building. Even if one 
refuses the idea of logical foundations of theories and tries to recover logic 
afterwards the problem of foundations still persists at least as a pedagogical problem. 
For no theory can be grasped at once but needs certain guiding mechanisms allowing to 
explore it piece by piece. In addition any theory needs an entry (or multiple entries). 
Let me briefly describe the idea of functorial semantics put forward in (Lawvere 
1963), which serves these purposes. It can be viewed as a simulation of formal 
axiomatic method by categorical means. This view on functorial semantics is helpful 
for comparing formal and categorical methods. 
Instead of writing axioms with usual strings of formulas one encodes axioms into a 
special "syntactic" category T which plays the role of "formal theory". Then like in the 
case of standard semantics one takes for granted a "background category" B, which is 
usually taken to be the category of sets but can be chosen differently. Models of T 
are functors of the form F : T-->B . This construction is that it allows for different 
notions of model dependent one specific properties of functors of form F. Another 
remarkable fact is that under rather general conditions T can be embedded into a 
category M(T,B) of its functorial models. This definitely changes the whole idea of 
theory as a structure over and above all its possible models and suggests the view on 
a theory as "generic model" (Lawvere 1963-2004, p.19) which generates other models 
like circles and straight lines generate further constructions in Euclid's Elements. The 
functorial semantics makes it clear that the requirement of categoricity (in Veblen's 
sense) is as much unrealistic as unnecessary: although "good" categorical properties 
of M(T,B) are much desirable there is no good reason to require that this category 
reduces to a single object.
10. Conclusion: Formalisation versus Categorification
Lawvere's functorial semantics has been developed for a special case of algebraic 
theories and so it cannot be immediately used as a method of theory-building 
applicable in all areas of mathematics. Since then a lot of technical work been done in 
related fields of categorical logic and categorical model theory. For a historical 
introduction and further references I refer the reader to (Bell 2005). The categorical 
method of theory-building is a work in progress, so to the date it doesn't exist in any 
standard form. The purpose of this non-technical paper is to provide this method with 
an appropriate epistemological background, which might motivate further technical 
work. So let me conclude with some general epistemological remarks.
The categorical method outlined above suggests an epistemic strategy, which differs 
from that suggested by formal method. In the latter case the general epistemic 
strategy is to subsume different objects under a common form and then stipulate this 
form as a self-standing abstract object. This amounts to identifying of given objects 
"up to isomorphism". Here "objects" may stand for various mathematical 
constructions including whole mathematical theories, so the sense in which the 
obtained formal object is "abstract" is relational. This leads to a traditional 
hierarchical structure of organisation of mathematical knowledge, where theories and 
concepts are subsumed under other theories and concepts, which are more abstract, 
more general and more formal. Apparently the same pattern applies at the interface 
between mathematics and the material world and is responsible for the usual 
qualification of mathematics as a formal science. This epistemic strategy I call 
formalisation. 
The alternative strategy of categorification is different. It is more general and in a 
sense more straightforward. Categorification amounts to taking into consideration all 
transformations, which can be described as categorical morphisms but not only 
reversible ones, i.e. not only isomorphisms. The requirement that objects and 
transformations in question make a category is much weaker than the requirement 
that these transformations are reversible (and so make a group). So formalisation is a 
special case of categorification. Unlike formalisation categorification in the general 
case doesn't subsume objects in question under a conceptual umbrella but simply links 
them (by mophisms) into into a whole, namely into a category. When objects are 
theories and morphisms are mutual interpretations of theories one gets a network of 
theories. Although this network might have no single "centre" it may be still coherent 
and well-manageable if it has "good" categorical properties. 
We see that categorification like formalisation serves for integration of mathematical 
knowledge. But categorification unlike formalisation doesn't bring about a hierarchical 
structure. Given that the very idea of foundations seems to imply a hierarchical 
structure of knowldge (which "starts with" foundations and then branches into various 
specific sub-domains) one may wonder if categorification is compatible with it. I think 
that at least one version of the notion of foundations remains viable in a categorical 
context, namely the pedagogical one stressed by Lawvere in his (2003). I mean the 
notion of foundations as an "entry" into a theoretical network.  Such entry should 
exist for any theoretical network but it obviously needs not to be unique. 
I suggest that hierarchical structures cannot any longer serve as universal models of 
organisation of knowledge just like they cannot any longer serve as models of 
organisation of our societies. But the task of integration of knowledge into a 
manageable whole remains pertinent as ever. I believe that categorical method of 
theory building outlined in this paper can be helpful for this task.
Endnotes:
(1) One might argue that I systematically confuse here two different notions of 
interpretation: (a) assignment of referents to primitive terms of a formal theory like 
"point" and "straight line"  (evaluation of logical variables) and (b) interpretation of one 
non-formal theory in terms of another non-formal theory like in the case when 
traditional geometrical points are represented by pairs of numbers. In fact in 
preceding paragraphs I'm talking only about (b) as also does Hilbert in the given quote. 
The argument which I develop below in the main text is this: the idea of formal theory 
and of interpretation in the sense (a) assumes that all models of a given formal theory 
are mutually reversibly interpretable in the sense (b).  But generally they are not.
(2) This logicism about mathematics should be distinguished from stronger form of 
logicism aiming at reduction of mathematics to logic. 
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